Abstract: This article assesses whether the United
I. Introduction
As the United Nations General Assembly stated, '… development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing'.
1 However, there may also exist a confl ict between peace and security on the one hand, and respect for human rights on the other hand. The United Nations Security Council, in particular, may affect international human rights when adopting sanctions on the basis of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to maintain or restore international peace and security. The Security Council has decided on economic embargos against Member States whose conduct constituted a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. Economic embargos have repercussions on the distribution of food and medicine, and therefore on the nutrition and health and even the survival, of the population of the targeted State. 2 These measures affect many international human rights, especially economic and social rights -such as the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to be free from hunger and the right to health. 3 Economic embargos may also have a negative im-© Verlag Österreich treaties drawn up under the auspices of the United Nations or in non-peremptory customary international law, when this is not incompatible with the Council objective of maintaining or restoring international peace and security. The Security Council must do so when it implements itself its coercive action or when it requires from States the implementation, without any margin of appreciation, of its coercive action. Part III then contends that the Security Council must comply with peremptory human rights, with no exception. This obligation applies when the Security Council implements its measures or when it asks States to enforce them, with no margin of discretion. Part IV fi nally concludes that Chapter VII action by the Security Council is limited only to a small extent by international human rights standards.
II. A Derogable Obligation of the Security Council to Respect Human Rights Contained in United Nations Human Rights Treaties or in Customary International Law
A. A Derogable Obligation to Respect Human Rights Contained in United Nations Human Rights Treaties
An Obligation to Promote and Encourage Respect for Human Rights
As an organ of the United Nations, the Security Council is bound by the United Nations Charter and enjoys powers only insofar as they are conferred on it or implied by that treaty. 18 Indeed, for the International Court of Justice, '[t] he political character of an organ cannot release it from the observance of the treaty provisions established by the Charter when they constitute limitations on its powers or criteria for its judgment'. 19 Reference can also be made to a statement of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: '[i]n any case, neither the text nor the spirit of the Charter conceives of the Security Council as legibus solutus (unbound by law) '. 20 In particular, in accordance with article 24 paragraph 2 of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council '... shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations'.
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The purposes and principles of the United Nations correspond to the purposes and principles of articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter. 22 This was recognised by the International Court of Justice. Indeed, the Court stated that the United Nations must respect the aim of the Charter to promote justice, that is referred to by article 1 of the Charter. 23 Thus, as an organ of the United Nations, the Security Council must act in conformity with the Purposes and Principles of the fi rst two articles of the United Nations
Charter. Article 1 paragraph 2 states in particular that one purpose of the United Nations is '... to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of ... self-determination of peoples'. Development of the observance of the principle of self-determination of peoples is included in the more general purpose of the United Nations, under article 1 paragraph 3. In accordance with that provision, one aim of the United Nations is '[t]o achieve international co-operation ... in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all'. Thus, the United Nations, including the Security Council, must promote and encourage respect for human rights by Member States. Article 55 refers to this obligation, stating that '…the United Nations shall promote ... universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all'. Article 13 paragraph 1 gives to the United Nations General Assembly the duty to initiate studies and make recommendations for the aim of '…assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms'. Article 62 paragraph 2 gives a similar function to the Economic and Social Council: the Council '…may make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all'. Finally, in conformity with article 76 of the United Nations
Charter, the trusteeship system shall '... encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all'. The expression 'human rights', as thus included in several provisions of the United Nations Charter, is not defi ned in the Charter. The participants in the preparatory work of the United Nations Charter wanted to include a human rights declaration in the Charter. However, due to a lack of time, such a declaration was not drafted and included in the Charter. 24 The project was postponed for later on. It took the form of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted on 10 December 1948 by the United Nations General Assembly.
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The Security Council can participate, and has participated in this purpose of the United Nations of the promotion of and encouragement for respect for human rights. The Security Council thus can condemn infringement of human rights by Member States and ask for observance of human rights. It can do so in simple recommendations, and also in binding resolutions. 26 Indeed, the Security Council may qualify grave violations of human rights linked to a present or impending armed confl ict or other destabilisation of the security of a country or region as 'a threat to the peace'. It may then order the relevant State to cease the violations. 27 The Security Council has also created peacekeeping operations whose aim is, among others, the promotion and protection of human rights. 28 Finally, the Security Council has established the international criminal tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, competent to judge the criminal responsibility of representatives of those States for grave violations of international humanitarian law, that also correspond to grave infringements of human rights.
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The Security Council would not only be bound by the provisions of the Charter but also by any other international treaty to which the United Nations is a party. In conclusion, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, the United Nations, including the Security Council, must promote and encourage respect for human rights by Member States. 41 The United Nations itself is not a party to any human rights treaty and is not bound by human rights treaties simply because they are binding upon its Member
States. Could an obligation of the United Nations, including the Security Council, to observe human rights treaties to which United Nations Member States are party be deduced from the United Nations obligation for promotion and encouragement of respect for human rights? The interpretation in good faith of a treaty corresponds to the reasonable interpretation of the terms of the treaty, taking into account the just expectations of the other party/parties. 45 If the general principle of good faith is applied to article 1 paragraph 3 of the Charter, it can be argued that the obligation of the United Nations -and of its different organs -to promote and encourage respect for human rights includes the obligation to respect those human rights as much as possible. The latter obligation is relevant only for the United Nations activities which have an impact on individuals. This impact can be direct, for instance due to resolutions of the United Nations Security Council applied directly to individuals. The impact can also be indirect, for example due to measures that implement United Nations Security Council resolutions without any margin of appreciation. The United Nations has fulfi lled its purpose of promoting and encouraging observance of human rights. It has done so in particular in developing a body of human rights treaties. For instance, the ICCPR and the ICESCR were drew up by the United Nations Economic and Social Council, then adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.
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Thus, if the United Nations interprets article 1 paragraph 3 of the Charter in good faith, as it should do, there is a legitimate expectation that it respects, to the greatest extent possible, human rights guaranteed by treaties prepared under its auspices, and in force, and that it asks States parties to those treaties, and United Nations members, to respect. In conclusion, it is here argued that the Council must respect, with some exceptions, human rights guaranteed in treaties developed within the framework of the United Nations and in force. Such an obligation is deduced from a reasonable interpretation of the United Nations Charter that is supported by the practice of the Security Council on Chapter VII. The Security Council is bound by that obligation when it enforces coercive measures having an impact on individuals or when it requires from Member States to implement, without any margin of appreciation, coercive measures that affect individuals. Although an international organisation is allowed to interpret its constituent instrument, it is not competent to impose interpretations objected to by a majority of its Member
States. 86 United Nations Member States do not contest the capacity of the Security Coun-81 The Spanish version reads: 'Los Propósitos de las Naciones Unidas son: 1. Mantener la paz y la seguridad internacionales, y con tal fi n: tomar medidas colectivas efi caces para prevenir y eliminar amenazas a la paz, y para suprimir actos de agresión uotros quebrantamientos de la paz; y lograr por medios pacífi cos, y de conformidad con los principios de la justicia y del derecho internacional, el ajuste o arreglo de controversias o situaciones internacionales susceptibles de conducir a quebrantamientos de la paz'. VII. There is however an exception to this possible derogation. As will be shown in part III of this paper, the Security Council must respect peremptory international human rights law and cannot require from Member States a deviation from this law.
C. Application of the Necessity-Proportionality Principle The Security Council is not obliged to fi rst adopt recommendations before going on to enforcement measures. It is even not obliged to have recourse fi rst to non-forcible measures before deciding on forcible measures. However, Chapter VII coercive measures must be necessary to counter or remove the threat to, or breach of, the peace, or act of aggression, and must be adapted to this end. In particular, with the 'adequacy' guidance in the implementation of articles 41 and 42, the Charter shows a desire to minimise the effect of enforcement measures without, as much as possible, compromising their effectiveness. There must be a rational link between the means and the end pursued, implying that the end should be achieved by the least restrictive means. This was affi rmed in debates of the Security Council. 93 Similarly, the General Assembly stated that '...
[s]anctions should be resorted to only with the utmost caution, when other peaceful options provided by the Charter are inadequate'. 94 Reference should also be made to the International Court of Justice, which found that action taken by the United Nations, which is '... appropriate for the fulfi lment of one of [its] stated purposes' (emphasis added), is presumed to be intra vires. 95 In conclusion, Chapter VII of the United Nations 
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Charter indicates that the Security Council is bound by a principle of necessity-proportionality in the implementation of that Chapter.
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As explained above, in part II A 2, in accordance with the principle of good faith, the Security Council must respect, as much as possible, human rights guaranteed by the United Nations treaties on human rights in force in two situations. First, it must do so when adopting measures affecting directly individuals. Second, it must do so when taking measures having an impact on individuals indirectly, through their implementation by United Nations Member States without any margin of appreciation -or by a regional organisation to which Member States transferred the implementation of Security Council measures. Furthermore, in conformity with the principle of necessity-proportionality, the Security Council must adapt the scope of its peace enforcement action to what seems to be necessary and proportionate to maintain or re-establish international peace and security. If the latter principle is applied to the obligation of the Security Council to respect in principle human rights in United Nations human rights treaties, it appears that the Council must respect those rights when adopting measures affecting individuals or when asking United Nations Member States to adopt measures having an impact on individuals, unless it is necessary to derogate from those human rights for the success of its coercive peace-keeping action. The scope of the derogation must then be as minimal as possible, and only to the extent required by the objective pursued, namely the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security.
As stated above, in part II B, the Security Council may, in peace enforcement action, derogate from non-peremptory customary international law, including customary international human rights law. It may also impose on United Nations Member States the need to derogate from that law in the enforcement of its mandatory measures. The implementation of the principle of necessity-proportionality inherent in coercive peace-keeping action of the Security Council allows it to ascertain when and to what extent the Council can fi rst, deviate from non-peremptory customary international law, in particular from customary international human rights law, second, can ask Member States to deviate from that law. It is submitted that the Security Council is allowed to do so, only if it is necessary for the success of its measures of peace enforcement and only to the extent required by this aim. Thus, the necessity-proportionality principle should apply to the deviation by the Security Council from human rights whether they are only enshrined in United Nations human rights treaties or also in non-peremptory customary international law. For instance, this principle should be implemented to the departure by the Security Council from the right to a fair trial guaranteed in the ICCPR (article 14) as well as, at least in its core components, in non-peremptory customary international law. 97 The necessity-proportionality principle also applies when the Security Council requires from 96 Judith G Gardam, 'Legal Restraints on Security Military Enforcement Action' (1995 -1996 For the customary nature of the core components of the right to a fair trial -determination of any criminal charge against an individual, or of his/her rights and obligations in a suit at law by an independent and impartial tribunal -, see supra n 75. It is however argued that the most fundamental guarantees of the right to a fair trial when the trial may lead to the death penalty are not only customary, but also peremptory. See infra part III B.
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Member States to depart from human rights in United Nations Human Rights treaties, and for some of those rights, also in non-peremptory customary international law.
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'Necessity' concerns whether the objective of the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security warrants a derogation from human rights; 'proportionality' determines the scope of the derogation from human rights that is justifi ed to achieve the goal. The United Nations, acting through the Security Council, has at its disposal a legal 'opt-out' regime, similar to legal emergency regimes that exist in most domestic legal orders. 99 It can 'contract out' of human rights guaranteed in United Nations human rights treaties, and, for some of those rights, also in non-peremptory customary international law. It can also require Member States that they depart from those rights in the implementation of its measures. It can do so in an emergency, that of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and only if it is necessary to react to that emergency.
In conclusion, the Security Council is bound by an obligation to observe human rights enshrined in United Nations human rights treaties and, for some of those rights, in non-peremptory customary international law. It is also bound by an obligation not to adopt measures whose implementation by United Nations Member States necessitates that they disregard those human rights. The same prohibition applies in the situation when Member States transferred the implementation of Security Council measures to a regional organisation, such as the European Union. The Security Council can depart from the two obligations referred to above, only if it is necessary for and proportionate to its aim of the maintenance or re-establishment of international peace and security. Therefore, it is here argued that the Security Council is only bound by derogable obligations of direct and indirect respect for those human rights guaranteed in United Nations human rights treaties and, concerning some of those rights, in non-peremptory customary international law.
Its Application
The United Nations Charter gives to the Security Council a broad margin of appreciation with respect to the necessity and proportionality of its coercive action. Commission of Human Rights, a public emergency must be actual or imminent; its effects must affect the whole nation; it must threaten the continuance of the organised life of the community; it must relate to an exceptional crisis or danger. 111 It is argued that the concept of 'public emergency' is similar to the concepts of 'threat to the peace', 'breach of the peace', or 'act of aggression' of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. 112 All concepts suppose the existence of a crisis that is actual or imminent, that affects a community -a national community or the international community of Statesand that threatens the functioning of that community. 113 Furthermore, like a public emergency in a State, a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, is offi cially proclaimed at the international level by the United Nations Security Council.
The question then arises whether article 4 paragraph 1 of the Covenant could be applied by analogy to Chapter VII action in order to justify the deviation from international human rights in the implementation of Security Council measures. In conformity with the Covenant, the scope of the derogations from human rights is strictly necessary 107 ICCPR art 4, para 1 (n 4) 174. A derogation from art 6, 7, 8, 11, 15, 16 and 18 ICCPR is however inadmissible in accordance with art 4 para 2. In addition to their derogation, many human rights provide themselves for their limitations. In the ICCPR, a number of articles refer to limiting human rights if it is provided by law and necessary in order to protect national security, public order, public health, morals, the rights and freedoms of others, or public safety. 108 UNHRC 'General Comment 29 States of Emergency (Article 4)' (2001) Council measure must be necessary and proportionate to the objective the measure is meant to reach at a given moment. The requirements of necessity and proportionality must be applied to the geographical and material scope as well as to the duration of the human rights derogation. Thus, the Security Council should assess whether its sanctions target the proper individuals. The Security Council should ensure that its sanctions do not affect human rights of those individuals in an unnecessary and unproportioned way.
Finally, the Security Council should adopt sanctions only as long as that appears neces- The European Court of Justice decided that the embargo imposed by the Security Council resolution was to apply to the aircraft. The Court noted that the objective of fundamental importance to the international community, which was to re-establish peace and security in Bosnia-Herzegovina, supervened over the rights of Bosphorus. It then ruled that the impounding of the aircraft was neither inappropriate nor disproportionate. Dulimi argued in particular that his right to a fair trial had been violated following the Swiss courts' refusal to adjudicate on the substance on a case he brought to the courts complaining that his assets had been frozen by the Swiss authorities. The confi scation of his assets was the result of the implementation, by Switzerland, of Security Council resolution 1483. The European Court of Human Rights acknowledged that the right to a fair trial could be limited under two conditions: there must be a legitimate aim and the limitation must be proportionate to that aim. 125 The aim, namely the maintenance of international peace and security, was recognised as legitimate. 126 The Court however, found that the denial by Switzerland of any judicial review was completely disproportionate to reach that objective. For the Court, the very essence of the right of access to a tribunal was impaired.
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The requirements of necessity and proportionality should also apply to action by the Security Council that is not enforced by Member States, but by the Council itself. Those requirements should in particular determine the lawfulness of the Security Council listing measures on diverse sanctions lists. There is no independent and impartial tribunal that reviews the listing or de-listing of individuals sanctioned by the Security Council. 131 Concerning the establishment of a tribunal to review the listing on the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list: Report submitted to the GA by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism (n 129) para 23 ('there is no sustainable vires objection to the establishment of a mechanism of independent judicial review'). Also Irène Couzigou, 'La lutte du Conseil de sécurité contre le terrorisme international et les droits de l'homme ' (2008) The right to life knows of exceptions. 167 One exception concerns in particular the death penalty, providing it is imposed in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and pursuant to a judgment. 168 Procedural guarantees secure the protection of the right to life. Indeed, the non-punishment without law and the right to a fair trial guarantee a fair imposition of the death penalty and thus protect the right to life. 169 The right not to be punished by the death penalty without law and the right to a fair trial when the death penalty may be imposed are accessory rights to the right to life. Thus, since this latter right cannot be derogated from under general international law, the right not to be punished to a sentence of death without law should itself be nonderogable. Similarly, the right to a fair trial, at least in its core content -determination of any criminal charge against an individual by an independent and impartial tribunalshould be non-derogable, when applied in a process in which the sentence of death may be pronounced. 170 Otherwise the intangibility of the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of his life could be circumvented. Thus, it is argued that the right not to be punished by the death penalty without law and the core components of the right to a fair trial in a process that may lead to the death penalty are peremptory.
In conclusion, in its Chapter VII action, the Security Council must respect and should not ask States to derogate from: the right to life; the right not to be tortured or to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; the right not to be sentenced to the death penalty without law; and the most fundamental guarantees of the right to a fair trial when a death sentence may be imposed. In practice however, it is very unlikely that In accordance with the analysis above, the Security Council must in principle respect human rights guaranteed in United Nations human rights treaties in force. The Security
Council should also, in principle, not adopt coercive measures whose implementation by United Nations Member States, or a regional organisation, involves a derogation from those rights. Deviation from those rights, by the Security Council, Member States, or a regional organisation, in the enforcement of Security Council resolutions, without any margin of appreciation, is legal only if it is necessary for the success of the Council in maintaining or re-establishing international peace and security. The scope of the derogation must then be as minimal as possible, thus only to the extent required by the aim pursued. Furthermore, the Security Council must observe customary international human rights and should not adopt measures whose enforcement by United Nations Member States, or a regional organisation, necessitates that they depart from those rights. It must do so, unless a derogation from those (non-peremptory) rights is necessary for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. Such derogation must further be proportionate to the aim pursued, namely the maintenance or re-establishment of peace and security. In sum, the Security Council has a derogable obligation to respect human rights, whether they are guaranteed in United Nations human rights treaties or also in (non-peremptory) customary international law. It has also a derogable obligation not to adopt coercive measures whose implementation by Member States or a regional organisation requires that they deviate from those rights. The principle of necessity-proportionality should justify departures from human rights when the Security Council implements coercive measures or when it imposes the implementation of coercive measures to Member States. This principle also applies when Member States transferred the implementation of Security Council measures to a regional organisation. In interpreting the principle of necessity-proportionality, the Security Council should use as a model the implementation of the principle of necessity-proportionality justifying derogations from the ICCPR. Finally, the Security Council is bound by an absolute obligation to conform to those human rights that are enshrined in peremptory international law. It should also not adopt measures whose implementation by Member States or a regional organisation involves an infringement of those rights. The Security Council enjoys a broad margin of appreciation on whether and how to depart from human rights in United Nations human rights treaties in force or in (non-peremptory) customary international human rights law, and on whether and how to require a derogation from those rights by Member States. Furthermore, there are currently only a few human rights that can be 171 Case Al-Jedda (n 70). See also in favour of such a presumption Nabil Sayadi and Patricia Vinck (n 12) 36 (individual opinion of Sir Nigel Rodley (concurring)).
considered as peremptory. Thus, in this author's opinion, the human rights standards outlined in this paper restrict the Security Council to a minimum extent.
Who could monitor observance by the Security Council of legal human rights constraints? An extensive analysis of the possibility of review of Security Council resolutions as regards international human rights limits is beyond the scope of this article. Only a few words will be said here. The International Court of Justice could pronounce, incidentally, on the legality of a Council decision concerning international human rights law in a contentious proceeding against any State. It could also assess the human rights legality of a Council measure in an advisory opinion, when the question of that legality is directly asked, or incidentally. However, this will not happen often, given the lack of compulsory contentious jurisdiction of the Court and need for a qualifi ed majority for requesting advisory opinions. 172 Furthermore, the judgment or advisory opinion, even if it will carry substantial weight, will not bind the Council. The United Nations Human Rights Committee and the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights can assess the legality of a State Member's act implementing a Security Council measure with no discretion and, at the same time, pronounce, incidentally, on the legality of the Security Council measure towards international human rights standards. These quasi-judicial organs can however not take binding decisions. As regards regional human rights bodies, such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, or regional or domestic courts, they can also review a measure, implementing without leeway for appreciation, a Security Council resolution, for compliance with a treaty or a legal order. They can then examine, incidentally, the lawfulness of the resolution itself. 173 Courts have already pronounced, incidentally, on the human rights compatibility of a Security Council measure with peremptory international human rights law. 174 They may also assess the compatibility of an act of the Security Council with human rights treaties and (non-peremptory) customary international human rights law.
The incidental assessment of the legality of a Security Council resolution by a regional or national court is not binding upon the Security Council. However, and this is more of a concern for the Security Council, a regional or domestic court can annul or declare illegal a measure implementing, with no latitude, a Security Council resolution, because it is in violation of human rights guaranteed under the international, or a regional or domestic, legal order. 175 In doing so, the court hinders the implementation of Security Council action.
Thus, the human rights constraints of the powers of the Security Council are not meaningless simply because they are not subject to an institutionalized judicial review.
Indeed, the reason for the Security Council to have to comply with human rights stan- They may even refuse to comply with a resolution that requires from them a departure from their human rights obligations. Thus, legal pressure (or another form of pressure) pushes the Security Council towards action that is more human rights compatible. For instance, it motivated the Security Council to amend the de-listing procedure from the then Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions list so that it became more compatible with the right to due process. 176 Therefore, in order to ensure the effective enforcement of Chapter VII action, the Security Council must conform with international human rights limits. As a political organ, the Council is not well suited to assess the legal human rights compatibility of its decisions. The same remark applies to the Security Council sanctions committees. Furthermore, the assessment of the Security Council conduct towards human rights should be uniform and coherent. Thus, in this author's view, the Security Council should
give to only one organ, composed of independent human rights experts, the competence to advise it on the conformity of its contemplated action as regards international human rights standards.
